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Abstract
Deep learning and other black-box models are becoming more and more popular 
today. Despite their high performance, they may not be accepted ethically or legally 
because of their lack of explainability. This paper presents the increasing number of 
legal requirements on machine learning model interpretability and explainability in 
the context of private and public decision making. It then explains how those legal 
requirements can be implemented into machine-learning models and concludes with 
a call for more inter-disciplinary research on explainability.
Keywords Interpretability · Explainability · Machine learning · Law
1 Introduction
As deep learning and other highly accurate black-box models develop, the social 
demand or legal requirements for interpretability and explainability of machine 
learning models are becoming more significant (Pasquale 2015; Doshi-Velez 
and Kortz 2017). Interpretability can be defined as the ability for a model to be 
understood by its users (Kodratoff 1994). For instance, decision trees with a small 
number of nodes can be considered interpretable, while support vector machines 
and neural networks are often considered as black boxes. However, despite these 
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intuitions, interpretability has yet to be defined formally in the literature (Bibal 
and Frénay 2016; Lipton 2016). Such a definition is hard to provide as it may 
depend, among other things on semantics and the level of expertise of the model’s 
users. Furthermore, in machine learning, interpretability and explainability have 
often been used as synonyms of each other (Bibal and Frénay 2016). Nowadays, 
the two terms are beginning to have different meanings (Guidotti et  al. 2018), 
with interpretability describing the fact that the model is understandable by its 
nature (e.g. decision trees) and explainability corresponding to the capacity of 
a black-box model to be explained using external resources (e.g. visualizations).
In law and ethics, the definitions are not precise either. The European Com-
mission notes that: “explainability of the algorithmic decision-making process, 
adapted to the persons involved, should be provided to the extent possible [...] In 
addition, explanations of the degree to which an AI system influences and shapes 
the organizational decision-making process, design choices of the system, as well 
as the rationale for deploying it, should be available, hence ensuring not just data 
and system transparency, but also business model transparency” (Communication 
from the Commission of 8 April 2019, Building Trust in Human-Centric Artifi-
cial Intelligence, COM(2019) 168).
This review paper aims at clarifying the meaning of explainability in law and 
studies how the legal requirements on explainability could be interpreted and 
applied in machine learning. This means finding how the concept of explaina-
bility that is discussed in legal texts can be translated in machine learning solu-
tions. This also means presenting how the machine learning literature implements 
the technical solutions derived from this translation. Section 2 reviews the main 
legal requirements on explainability of machine learning models and decisions. 
Section  3 presents the possible translation of explainability from the legal to 
the machine learning literature, as well as the machine learning challenges that 
emerge from the legal requirements. Finally, Sect. 4 concludes by discussing the 
conceptual difference between the legal requirements on explainability and their 
technical implementation and by proposing future directions in machine learning 
related to these challenges.
2  Legal requirements on explainability
Explainability obligations depend on who makes the decisions, and on the degree 
of automation of the decision-making process. Indeed, requirements are stronger 
for public authorities than for private firms. They are also stronger when the deci-
sion-making process is completely automated (i.e., when no humans are in the 
loop). As the desired technical outcomes of legal requirements are not always 
clearly understandable from the legal texts, they need to be clarified on the basis 
of their objectives. In that perspective, this section analyses in turn explainability 
obligations that exist in private decision-making (Sect. 2.1), in public decision-
making (Sect. 2.2), and the reasons for such requirements (Sect. 2.3).
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2.1  Weaker explainability requirements in B2C and B2B
While public decision-making, in administration and justice, always needs an expla-
nation (see Sect.  2.2 below), private decision-making in Business-to-Consumers 
(B2C) and Business-to-Business (B2B) relationships only needs explanation when 
a specific law requires it. This section considers two different types of laws that can 
impose explanation obligations on private companies, namely horizontal (transver-
sal) and vertical (sectoral) rules. The first ones apply to all sectors of the economy, 
while the second ones only apply to specific sectors providing more detailed rules to 
better take into account their characteristics.
2.1.1  Horizontal rules and explainability requirements
The main explainability obligations come from data protection law (in the Euro-
pean Union, the General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679, GDPR). They apply 
when the decisions (i) involve the processing of personal data, (ii) are based solely 
on an automated processing of data and (iii) produce legal or significant effects on 
the recipient of the decision, whatever the field of activity in which those decisions 
occur. For instance, an automatic refusal of an online credit application is subject to 
such obligations (art. 22(1) and recital 71 of the GDPR).
In this case, the processors of personal data have the obligation to give certain 
information to recipients of decisions. One type of information relates to explain-
ability and is defined as “meaningful information about the logic involved, as well 
as [...] the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject” (art. 13 
(2f) and 14 (2g) of the GDPR). This information must be given to the data subjects 
at the time of the collection of personal data, before any automated decision is made. 
The same information may also be required by data subjects at any time, before and/
or after such a decision is made (art. 15 (1h) of the GDPR). In addition, processors 
of personal data should implement suitable measures in order for recipients of auto-
mated decisions to be able to express their point of view and to contest the decision 
ex post, after the decision is made and communicated to its recipient (art. 22(3) of 
the GDPR).
Those articles of the GDPR do not explicitly require data processors to provide 
the explanation of decisions made, but the different obligations imposed on proces-
sors of personal data can be interpreted as imposing such explanation. This inter-
pretation is confirmed by the recital 71 of the GDPR which provides for the right to 
obtain an explanation of fully-automated decision in order to be able to challenge the 
decision. The existence of an explanation requirement in the GDPR is still debated 
among legal scholars as explainability is only specifically mentioned in a non-bind-
ing recital and not in a binding article of law. The majority of scholars support this 
requirement of explanation (Goodman and Flaxman 2016; Malgieri and Comandé 
2017; Edwards and Veale 2018; Selbst and Powles 2017). They argue that Recital 71 
should be used to complement and explain the binding requirements of the Regula-
tion, on the basis of a systemic interpretation of the text (i.e. a type of interpretation 
of legal texts that focuses on the law as a whole, given its context and objectives). 
However, a minority of scholars reject the existence of a right to explanation for 
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the following reasons (Wachter et al. 2017). They argue that the European Parlia-
ment wanted the requirement for data controllers to explain their automated deci-
sions inside the binding part of the text (Article 22), but this was finally not agreed 
during the political negotiations leading to the adoption of the GDPR. Hence, they 
argue, the term explanation was voluntarily placed within the non-binding Recital 
71 by the European legislator. Thus, the final interpretation will have to be given by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union at some point in the future.
The type of explanation to be given by the processors of personal data is not clear 
either. In their interpretative guidance on the meaningful information to be given, 
the data protection authorities in Europe note that the processors “should find simple 
ways to tell the data subject about the rationale behind or the criteria relied on in 
reaching the decision,” but not “a complex explanation of the algorithms used or the 
disclosure of the full algorithm. The information provided should, however, be suf-
ficiently comprehensive [...] to understand the reasons for the decision” (Guidelines 
of the European Data Protection Board of 3 October 2017 on Automated individ-
ual decision-making and Profiling, p. 25). This interpretation leaves uncertainty on 
the type and content of explanations to be given by data processors, as the “ration-
ale behind the decision” and the “criteria relied upon” are not the same and imply 
different technical solutions. In addition, the level of detail of the explanation that 
should be given to data subjects is not specified.
Next to data protection law, explainability obligations in B2C relationships 
may also derive from consumer protection law. As consumers are in a situation 
of weakness and lack bargaining power in their relations with businesses, several 
rules protect them from unfair practices. In the European Union, a reform of con-
sumer protection law, adopted in 2019, imposes on online marketplaces an obliga-
tion to provide “the main parameters determining ranking [...] of offers presented 
to the consumer as result of the search query and the relative importance of those 
parameters as opposed to other parameters” (new art. 6(a) of Directive 2011/83 on 
Consumer Rights). The reform clarifies that “parameters determining the ranking 
mean any general criteria, processes, specific signals incorporated into algorithms 
or other adjustment or demotion mechanisms used in connection with the ranking” 
(recital 22 of Directive 2019/2161 on better enforcement and modernization of EU 
consumer protection rules).
In parallel, the European Union has adopted very similar obligations for online 
intermediation services and search engines to the benefit of their business users 
(B2B). Indeed, the business users of such services are in a situation of weak-
ness that can be compared to the one of consumers, in their relations to this type 
of service providers. Providers of online intermediation services have to “set out 
in their terms and conditions the main parameters determining ranking and the 
reasons for the relative importance of those main parameters as opposed to other 
parameters”. Similarly, the providers of online search engines have to “set out the 
main parameters, which individually or collectively are most significant in deter-
mining ranking and the relative importance of those main parameters, by provid-
ing an easily and publicly available description, drafted in plain and intelligible 
language, on the online search engines of those providers” (art. 5 of Regulation 
2019/1150 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online 
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intermediation services). The Regulation clarifies that “the notion of main param-
eter should be understood to refer to any general criteria, processes, specific sig-
nals incorporated into algorithms or other adjustment or demotion mechanisms 
used in connection with the ranking” (recital 24 of Regulation 2019/1150).
2.1.2  Sectoral rules and explainability requirements
Some legal rules are designed for particular sectors and contain more detailed 
norms tailored to the needs and characteristics of each sector. For instance, this 
is the case for the financial and insurance sectors. Regarding the trading of finan-
cial instruments, the investment firm that engages in algorithmic trading should 
notify it the financial regulator so that the authority “may require the investment 
firm to provide, on a regular or ad-hoc basis, a description of the nature of its 
algorithmic trading strategies, details of the trading parameters or limits to which 
the system is subject, the key compliance and risk controls that it has in place 
[...] and details of the testing of its systems. The competent authority [...] may, at 
any time, request further information from an investment firm about its algorith-
mic trading and the systems used for that trading.” Moreover, when an investment 
firm engages in a high-frequency algorithmic trading technique, it should “store 
in an approved form accurate and time sequenced records of all its placed orders, 
including cancellations of orders, executed orders and quotations on trading ven-
ues and make them available to the competent authority upon request” (art. 17(2) 
of the Directive 2014/65 on Markets in financial Instruments).
Regarding the provision of insurance services to consumers, the Belgian law 
states that insurance providers must inform their subscribers, in an individual and 
understandable way, of the segmentation criteria used to determine a tariff and 
the extent of the guarantee. The insurers also have to inform their customers of 
the criteria that might have an impact on the future of the insurance policy. Fur-
thermore, in the case of a proposal for a modification of the tariff or of the extent 
of the guarantee, due to a modification of the risk that an insured person repre-
sents, the insurer has to motivate his proposal on the basis of the data and criteria 
used to assess the modification of the risk (art. 46 of the Belgian law of 4 April 
2014 on insurances).
2.2  Stronger explainability requirements in G2C
When decisions are adopted by public authorities such as administrations and 
judges in Government-to-Citizens relationships (G2C), providing explanations on 
those decisions is always compulsory, and the legal obligations for explainability 
are stronger than in B2C. In law, this type of requirement is called ‘motivation’. 
Among public authorities, the obligations are stronger for judges than for admin-
istrations. This subsection analyses the requirements of motivation for adminis-
trative decisions and, then, for judicial decisions.
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2.2.1  Administrative decisions and explainability requirements
Administrative decisions must comply with a principle of formal motivation 
(Wiener 1969), requiring that all factual and legal grounds on which the deci-
sion is based should be mentioned and explained. The motivation has to be clear, 
precise and reflect the real motives behind a decision (e.g. the Belgian law of 29 
July 1991 on the formal motivation of administrative decisions). This requirement 
is imposed at the European Union level by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
which states that “every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled 
impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the Union. This right includes: [...] the obligation of the admin-
istration to give reasons for its decisions”(art. 41 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union).
The intensity of the motivation depends on the level of discretionary power 
enjoyed by the administrative authority (Autin 2011). If an administrative deci-
sion is made on the basis of objective conditions, the required motivation is 
weaker, so that the administration only has to explain in its decision that the con-
ditions required by the applicable legal text are fulfilled. An example could be the 
award of a university degree. If all the credits of the curriculum are passed by a 
student, the university can limit its motivation to that finding to give the degree. 
When administrative bodies have more discretionary power, they have to motivate 
more their choices and legal reasoning. For example, staff selection requires more 
precise and specific motivation. Another example of more extensive motivation 
requirements for administrative decisions could be the award of contract after a 
public tender. Among the various proposals submitted by applicants, the adminis-
trative authority has to choose one, and explain precisely why it chooses that one 
over another one. In this regard, European law provides that public contracting 
authorities should inform each candidate and tenderer of decisions reached con-
cerning the conclusion of the public procurement including the grounds for any 
decision. On request from the candidate or tenderer concerned, the contracting 
authority should ”inform: (a) any unsuccessful candidate of the reasons for the 
rejection of its request to participate, (b) any unsuccessful tenderer of the reasons 
for the rejection of its tender, [...] (c) any tenderer that has made an admissible 
tender of the characteristics and relative advantages of the tender selected as well 
as the name of the successful tenderer [...], (d) any tenderer that has made an 
admissible tender of the conduct and progress of negotiations and dialogue with 
tenderers” (art. 55 of the Directive 2014/24 on public procurement).
When the administrative decision-making process is automated, additional 
explainability requirements may apply. One of the most comprehensive set of rules 
is in the French law which provides that “the administration gives to the person sub-
ject to the individual decision adopted on the basis of an algorithmic process, upon 
request of such person, in a intelligible manner and without prejudice of any trade 
secret protected by law, the following information: (1) the degree and the manner to 
which the algorithmic process contributed to the decision-making, (2) the data pro-
cessed and their sources, (3) the parameters used for the process and, where appro-
priate, their weighting, applied to the individual case, (4)  the operations carried 
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out by the processing” (art. R. 311-3-1-2 of the French Code on the relationships 
between the public and the administration).
An example of such an automated administrative decision-making process is the 
French software Parcoursup that determines which studies students should start, on 
the basis of their background, results in high school, available places in the chosen 
fields of studies, etc. When this software produces outputs for students, the French 
Code on the relationships between the public and the administration explained 
above should apply in principle. However, there is a specific derogation for Parcour-
sup, in order to protect the secrecy of the deliberations of the selecting teams. This 
derogation limits the information to be given to recipients of the decisions to the 
administrative documents used to make the decision, and forbids the disclosure of 
the weighting of parameters used to make the decisions, as well as the disclosure 
of the operations carried out by the processing (art. L. 612-3 of the French Code on 
education).
2.2.2  Judicial decisions and explainability requirements
Judicial decisions must also comply with the principle of motivation. This obligation 
is imposed by several laws, in particular the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The European Court of Human Rights decided in various cases that: “in accordance 
with Article 6(1) of the Convention, judgments of courts and tribunals should ade-
quately state the reasons on which they are based” (Cases Salov v. Ukraine, request 
no 65518/01, 6 September 2005, Sect. 89; Boldea v. Romania, request no 19997/02, 
15 February 2007, Sect. 23; Gradinar v. Moldova, request no 7170/02, 8 April 2008, 
Sect. 107). In addition, the European countries have similar obligations in their Con-
stitutions (e.g. in Belgium, art. 149 of the Constitution, and art. 79 of the Code on 
judicial proceedings).
The judicial motivation requirement is more stringent than the one applicable to 
administrative decisions (Alonso 2012). Judges have to explain all the factual and 
legal grounds on which their decisions are based, but they also have to answer all the 
arguments made by the parties during the trial. As judges need to interpret and apply 
the relevant laws to given cases, they need to strongly motivate how they make a 
specific legal decision, and why they retain the various arguments of the parties sup-
porting their claims. However, the level of detail required for the answers of judges 
to the arguments of the parties is dependent on the circumstances of the case (Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, Garcia Ruiz v. Spain, request no30544/96, 21 January 
1999, Sect. 26). If a judgment is produced by machine learning tools, the same rules 
apply in relation to the motivation of the judgment, as these rules do not focus on 
whom (i.e. a judge or a machine) makes the decision but only on the fact that a judg-
ment is made.
2.3  Why legal requirements on explainability?
Previous sections showed that European and national laws already contain several obli-
gations on explainability and, given the ethical importance of the issue, those rules may 
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be strengthened in the future (Commission White Paper on AI, COM(2020)65, p. 20). 
Some rules apply generally, to all types of decision-making, while other rules, often 
stricter, apply specifically to automated decision-making. Stricter rules apply to auto-
mated decision because, as precised in the Commission White Paper on AI (p. 11), 
errors and biases may have much larger effects in AI decision making than in human 
decision making. Moreover, it seems that many humans trust less AI systems than other 
humans. Both types of rules are often general and imprecise. This means that clarifica-
tions will have to be given by the enforcers of the rules, and ultimately by the judges, in 
case of conflict on the meaning and implications of a particular explainability obliga-
tion. To decide on the interpretation of an unspecified legal rule, enforcers and judges 
rely on legal texts, but also on the goals pursued by the rules. Legal obligations on 
explainability pursue in general two main objectives. The first one benefits the recipi-
ents of the decisions, while the second one benefits the public enforcers or the judges.
The first objective of explainability rules is to allow the recipients of a decision to 
understand its rationale and to act accordingly (Alonso 2012). Indeed, it is very dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to react to a decision when the reasoning and process that led 
to the outcome are unknown. In B2C or in B2B relationships, customers can act by 
changing providers and/or by contesting the decision before a Court when they think 
the decision is based on illegal grounds. For instance, if a customer seeks credit from 
her bank and such credit is denied, the applicant needs to receive meaningful explana-
tion of the denial (e.g. the income is not sufficient). On that basis, the customer can 
decide to go to another bank relying on other (and more favourable) criteria or to con-
test the negative decision before courts if it was based on prohibited selection criteria 
(such as race or gender in some cases). In G2C relationships, the recipient of the deci-
sion cannot “vote with their feet” and change administration or judge when dissatisfied 
with the criteria used by the public authority, but can always contest the legality of the 
decision before a superior judge.
The second objective of explainability is to allow the public authority, before which 
a private or a public decision is contested, to exercise a meaningful effective control 
on the legality of the decision (Commission White Paper on AI, p. 14). Going back 
to the previous example of credit denial, the judge has to know the criteria on which 
the refusal was based to determine whether prohibited criteria were used to refuse the 
credit. In addition, even if a specific decision is not contested, more transparency and 
explainability increase the incentives of decision makers not to rely on illegal criteria 
as it would be more difficult (but not impossible) for them to hide the use of such ille-
gal criteria, and hence easier to condemn them if they were using them. Reflecting the 
traditional view that “sunlight is the best disinfectant”, transparency and explainability 
increase the effectiveness of the whole legal system by facilitating the identification of 
its violation.
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3  Impact of the legal requirements on ML explainability
The legal requirements on explainability explained in Sect. 2 raise several challenges 
in machine learning at varying degrees. This Section shows how the legal require-
ments on explainability can be expressed in machine learning terms. It also shows 
how difficult it may be to comply with these legal requirements.
In order to introduce the technical understanding of the requirements imposed by 
the law, Sect. 3.1 presents some background on machine learning as well as some 
technical vocabulary. Section 3.2 proposes a technical interpretation of legal require-
ments in B2C and B2B. Those requirements relate to the weaker requirements of 
Sect.  2.1. Finally, some technical solutions that can be provided to the stronger 
requirements on explainability that are encountered in administrative and judicial 
decisions (G2C) of Sect. 2.2 are presented in Sect. 3.3.
3.1  Background on machine learning
This section introduces some background (and associated terms) needed to under-
stand the impact of legal explainability on machine learning. Figure  1 presents a 
typical machine learning pipeline. As this paper is concerned with decisions, the 
pipeline is focused on supervised learning. It starts with data (Fig. 1(1)), also called 
a dataset) that are generally gathered by experts. These data contains two parts: 
(i)  the targets to predict, which can be a continuous variable (e.g. the amount of a 
fine to be paid) or a categorical variable (e.g. guilty or not), and (ii) a set of instances 
(e.g. persons) characterized by features. The data are provided to a training algo-
rithm (Fig.  1(2)) that optimizes the mathematical parameters of a model (i.e. the 
mathematical expression that is learned to make decisions, see Fig. 1(3)) given the 
data at hand. When the model is trained, it can be used with instances that have not 
been used for the training phase (called unseen instances) to predict the unknown 
target value of these instances (Fig.  1(4)). When a set of predictions have been 
made, performance measures are run on the result to assess the quality of the model 
(Fig. 1(5)). In the context of category prediction (a task called classification), a typi-
cal performance measure is the accuracy, which corresponds to the amount of cor-
rect predictions over all predictions that have been made by the model.
Despite the fact that regulating any module of the model production process 
affects the learned model, the notion of explainability studied here relates to expla-
nations that can be provided on the model and its decisions. More precisely, two 
kinds of models can be described: interpretable models and black-box models. 
Interpretable models are models that are understandable either because they have a 
simple mathematical expression (e.g. linear models) or because their representation 
allows users to understand their mathematical expression (e.g. decision trees). On 
the contrary, black-box models are models with a complex mathematical expression 
that, moreover, do not possess a representation that can ease their understanding 
(Bibal and Frénay 2016). In the context of black-box models, which are not inter-
pretable by definition, the way to improve understanding is through explanations. 

































Fig. 1  The user classically provides structured data in a tabular format (1). The columns of the data table 
correspond to features of the instances in the rows. In this example based on the Adult dataset (Dua 
and Graff 2017), the instances are people that are characterized by socio-demographic features. The tar-
get is a special column containing what should be predicted (whether a particular person earns more or 
less than $50 K/year, in this example). The data is provided to a training algorithm (2) that will learn a 
model (3). When the model is learned, it can be used to make predictions on instances that have not been 
used for training (called unseen instances) (4). Performance measures (such as the accuracy of the pre-
dictions) are then computed to evaluate the performance of the model (5)
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Explainability is therefore the capacity of a model to be explainable by using meth-
ods that are external to the black-box model (e.g. visualizations, approximating it 
with interpretable models, etc.) (Guidotti et al. 2018; Mittelstadt et al. 2019).
Furthermore, three hierarchical elements of the model can be focused by legal 
requirements. Figure 2 shows these three views with a schematic decision tree as 
example. Note that the hierarchy presented in this paper follows the legal require-
ments. Indeed, other hierarchy of model explanation can be proposed (e.g. see Lepri 
et al. 2018). The first view of the model that we present is the whole model, which 
is, in the example of Fig. 2, the complete decision tree (see Fig. 2(1)). When using 
this kind of model to reach a decision, a first question Q 
1
 is asked. If the answer is 
yes (or true), the question Q 
2
 is asked, and Q 
3
 otherwise. This process continues 
until the end of the tree (also called a leaf) is reached, where a decision D i is taken. 
The second view of the model that can be targeted by requirements is a particular 
decision made by the model (see Fig. 2(2)). Finally, the features that are involved 
in a particular decision can also be the focus of legal requirements (see Fig. 2(3)). 
In that case, it is not asked how the features are combined to make the decision, but 
only to provide the list of features that are used to make a decision.
The different ways legal requirements on explainability in B2C and B2B deci-
sions can be considered in machine learning are presented in Sect. 3.2. The technical 
solutions to the stronger legal requirements in G2C are discussed in Sect. 3.3.
3.2  Weaker requirements: different explainability levels
As shown in Sect. 2, there is no unique definition of explainability in law. Some explain-
ability requirements relate to the model while others relate to the decision (Wachter 
et al. 2017; Selbst and Barocas 2018). In addition, some explainability requirements 
merely relate to the features used by the model to adopt the decision, while others go 
further and relate to the way the features are combined to make the decision. Further-
more, there can be technical ambiguities regarding legal texts and their interpretation. 
For instance, the interpretative guidelines on the GDPR by the data protection authori-
ties refer to the “rationale behind” or the “criteria relied on in reaching the decision” 







Fig. 2  Weaker requirements can focus on three views of a model: (1) the whole model, (2) a particular 
decision of the model (here when Q 
1
= no and Q 
3
= yes), or (3) the features involved in a particular deci-
sion (e.g. the age of person (X
1
 ) and the salary (X
3
 ) if they are used in questions such that “is his age 
lower than 18?” (Q
1
 ) and “is his annual salary lower than 50 k/year?” (Q
3
))
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(Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling, p. 25), which cor-
respond to two technically different requirements.
Therefore, this section analyzes in turn the technical understanding of four lev-
els of legal requirements: providing the main features that are used in the model or 
in a decision (Sect.  3.2.1), providing all features that are used in a particular deci-
sion (Sect. 3.2.2), providing the feature combination that is used to make a decision 
(Sect. 3.2.3) and providing an interpretable model (Sect. 3.2.4). The inputs and outputs 
of the learning process constrained by the weaker requirement in B2C and B2B are 
presented in Fig. 3 and the way directive and regulation examples are technically inter-





Weaker Requirements (B2C and B2B)
Business Decisions
Fig. 3  Input and output of the learning process with legal requirements on explainability in B2C and 
B2B
Table 1  Summary of the legal texts used as examples in Sect. 3.2
Main features
 Directive 2011/83 on Consumer Rights, art. 6(a): obligation to provide “the main parameters” and 
“the relative importance of those parameters”
 Regulation 2019/1150 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online 
intermediation services, art. 5: obligation to provide “the main parameters” and “the relative 
importance of those parameters”
All features
 Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling: obligation to provide “the 
criteria relied on in reaching the decision”
 Belgian law of 4 April 2014 on insurances, art. 46: obligation to provide “the segmentation 
criteria”
Combination of features
 Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling: obligation to provide “the 
rationale behind the decision”
Whole model
 Directive 2014/65 on Markets in Financial Instruments, art. 17: obligation to provide “informa-
tion [...] about its algorithmic trading and the systems used for that trading”
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3.2.1  Requirements on the main features
From a machine learning point of view, the legal texts in B2C and B2B (see 
Sect. 2.1) refer to four levels of requirement. The first and weakest requirement asks 
to provide the “main parameters” of the model, or used by the model to take a par-
ticular decision. “Parameters” in those legal texts correspond to features of instances 
in machine learning (see Fig. 1 for a background on machine learning). The method-
ology used to make the distinction between the main features and the other features 
is not described in the legal texts. Many machine learning models make it possible 
to extract the main features they use, even black-box models. The new art. 6(a) of 
Directive 2011/83 on Consumer Rights states that the “main default parameters” 
should be provided, without the obligation to instantiate for a particular decision. 
This means that the main features used by the entire model, not for a particular deci-
sion, should be provided.
Providing the main features used in a model is well-developed in the machine 
learning literature. For linear models, such as linear regression models, a kind 
of interpretable (or transparent) model, one only has to look at the weights that 





 , ..., d for predicting a target t, the goal of the linear model train-













) +⋯ + (wd ∗ d) best predicts t. If the d features are trans-
formed in order to be in the same scale (a transformation called scaling), sorting 
the absolute value of the computed weights provide a ranking of the feature impor-
tance in the model. In particular, a weight wj of zero means that the feature j is not 
used. For instance, if t correspond to house prices to predict, |wnumber of rooms| = 5 
and |whouse age| = 2.5 mean that the feature “number of rooms” is twice as important 
as the feature “house age” when predicting house prices. Some works go further 
and try to determine the features with a non-zero weight that are particularly rel-
evant in a given linear model (e.g. Yu and Liu 2004; Frénay et  al. 2014). In that 
context, a feature is considered strongly relevant if, by removing it, the performance 
of the model drops. Some features can also be characterized as weakly relevant if 
they bring new information, but only if other features are removed (John et al. 1994; 
Kohavi and John 1997; Frénay et al. 2014). These techniques for studying feature 
relevance in models such as linear models are important because such simple mod-
els are widely used in academia, as well as in industry.
In the case of black-box models, features may also be sorted by importance. For 
instance, random forests (Breiman 2001) use an out-of-bag error during the learn-
ing of the decision tree ensemble that can be used to rank features by importance. 
More precisely, when learning the decision trees in the forest, different sub-sets of 
training instances are used for learning each tree. The out-of-bag error is defined as 
the average error made in the prediction of each instance xi for each decision tree 
that has not been trained using this xi (Breiman 2001). In order to know what are 
the important features, values of each feature j are perturbed (i.e. the values of the 
feature are changed randomly) and the out-of-bag error is computed. A feature j is 
considered important if the perturbation of its values increases the out-of-bag error, 
with respect to the out-of-bag error computed without the perturbation. This idea of 
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perturbing feature values to assess the importance of each feature used in a model 
can in fact be extrapolated and applied to any machine learning algorithm (Fisher 
et al. 2018). In the case of computer vision, where images are used as input, it is 
less relevant to extract the main features (i.e pixels) used by a model. Instead, one is 
rather interested in the internal representation used by the model (the extracted fea-
tures in hidden layers of neural networks). However, extracting the internal features 
of neural networks is a challenging problem in the machine learning literature. For 
deep convolutional neural networks, techniques such as saliency maps (Simonyan 
et al. 2013) and Grad-CAM (Selvaraju et al. 2017) can be used, yet they only extract 
the main features for specific decisions.
3.2.2  Requirements on all features
The second requirement level is to provide all the features used to take a particular 
decision. For instance, this is the case of the obligations arising from the GDPR as 
interpreted by the data protection authorities, under the terms “the criteria relied on 
in reaching the decision” (Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and 
Profiling, p. 25). This means providing all features with a non-zero coefficient in a 
linear model, or the features in a specific decision path of a decision tree, without 
necessarily providing the whole tree. Providing all features involved in a particular 
decision may be motivated by the need to verify the absence of features (or proxies) 
that are forbidden to use by law (e.g. those that illegally discriminate people).
While it is still possible for all models (using perturbation, for instance, in the 
case of black-box models) to produce such list of features used, the issue lies in the 
size of the list. Indeed, providing all features with a non-zero coefficient in a linear 
model is straightforward, but processing thousands of them as a human is difficult. 
In order to avoid this issue, some machine learning algorithms incorporate a trade-
off between the model accuracy and its complexity. For instance, a technique called 
Lasso makes it possible to set as many weights wj as possible to zero when learning 
a linear model (effect called sparsity), while keeping a good enough predictive accu-
racy (Tibshirani 1996). This makes the resultant linear models much easier to under-
stand. In practice, the balance between accuracy and complexity of the model has to 
be tuned by the user, depending on his needs. If no means to control the model com-
plexity are provided in the learning algorithm, the problem slides from the machine 
learning side to the information visualization side, where questions about how to 
efficiently present information to users is the core issue.
3.2.3  Requirements on the combination of features in a decision
The third requirement level is about the complete explanation of a decision. For 
instance, this is the case of the obligations arising from the GDPR as interpreted by 
the data protection authorities, under the terms “the rationale behind the decision” 
(Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling, p. 25). This 
means providing not only the features used in a decision, but also their combination 
used to make the particular prediction.
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As developed in the literature on interpretability and explainability, this requires 
to use transparent models such as decision trees or linear models, to create new 
ones (e.g. supersparse linear integer models (SLIM)  Ustun et  al. 2013a, b; Ustun 
and Rudin 2016) or to create ways to explain black-box models (e.g. local interpret-
able model-agnostic explanations (LIME) Ribeiro et al. 2016). One typical example 
of interpretable models are the sparse linear models. Most of the time, sparsity in 
linear models is achieved using Lasso through the 
1
-norm (minimize the sum of 
all weight absolute values, 
∑
i �wi� ), which is an approximation of the difficult-to-
optimize 
0
-norm (minimize the number of non-zero weights). SLIM are models 
that optimize the 
0
-norm by transforming the problem. Indeed, instead of optimiz-
ing weights wj with real values, those weights can now take values among a finite set 
of integer values. Thanks to that transformation, SLIM are more interpretable than 
classical models by being sparser and by using only integers (instead of reals) as 
weights, while obtaining similar accuracy scores.
In the case of black-box models, model-agnostic ways to understand those models 
can be considered. LIME is a technique used to understand specific decisions of a 
black-box model through the use of an interpretable model. For instance, a specific 
decision on an instance i made by a black-box neural network can be understood by 
approximating the decision through local decisions (i.e. decisions that are made on 
instances similar to the instance i, see Fig.  4). This local model, explaining local 
decisions, should be interpretable. This local model, that can be a linear model, 
does not globally explain the black box, but instead provides clues on why a spe-
cific decision has been taken by the black-box model. This can be compared to the 
Local explanation
Decision boundary
Fig. 4  Figure inspired by Ribeiro et al. (2016). Local explanation of a complex decision boundary (i.e. 
separating circles and triangles) by using a linear model. The linear model is easy to understand (using 
the relative value of the weights), but only provides an explanation on the complex decision boundary 
locally, where it is used
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explanation of a particular path in a decision tree: the explanation of the path is local 
and does not globally explain the whole tree.
3.2.4  Requirements on the whole model
A global understanding of the model would be the maximal explainability require-
ment that can be asked for a model. Indeed, as a total understanding of the model is 
required, local explanations cannot suffice. In that case, the legal requirement would 
constrain the possible usable models to interpretable ones. This kind of requirement 
exists in the case of financial algorithms, as in addition to provide “a description of 
the nature of its algorithmic trading strategies, details of the trading parameters or 
limits to which the system is subject, the key compliance and risk controls that it has 
in place [...] and details of the testing of its systems,” investment firms can be asked 
to provide information “about its algorithmic trading and the systems used for that 
trading” (art. 17(2) of the Directive 2014/65 on Markets in Financial Instruments).
Moreover, in machine learning, Rudin (2019) argues for the need to use interpret-
able models (such as linear or rule-based models Guidotti et  al. 2018), instead of 
explaining black boxes, in the case of high-stake decisions. This is justified by the 
fact that the drop in accuracy caused by the choice of an interpretable model can be 
marginal, for the benefit of having a model that can be understood and trusted by its 
users.
Section 3.2 presented a translation in vocabulary from the legal literature to the 
machine literature through four requirement levels related to the weak (B2C and 
B2B) legal requirements. The four levels were (i) providing the main features used in 
a decision or the model, (ii) providing all features processed by the model, (iii) pro-
viding a comprehensive explanation of a specific decision taken by the model and 
(iv)  providing an interpretable model. The next section focuses on the stronger 
(G2C) legal requirements and the new machine learning problems that emerge.
3.3  Stronger requirements: new machine learning problems
In addition to the different levels of explanation described in Sect. 3.2, legal moti-
vations need to be given when administrative decisions are made by the model. 
In the case of administrative decisions, models are now required to provide the 










Fig. 5  Inputs/outputs of the learning process for administrative decisions
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decisions and legal rules supporting these decisions (see Fig.  5). For instance, 
decision trees would have to output the legal bases supporting the paths leading 
to decisions.
On top of this, according to requirements applicable to judicial decision mak-
ing, judicial decisions need to respond to the arguments submitted by the parties. 
In this context, a situation described by facts is provided as input to the model, 
along with textual arguments from both opposing parties. The model has then to 
output the decision, supported by legal articles as for administrative decisions, 
while at the same time answering all arguments (see Fig. 6). This means that the 
provided arguments have to be considered by the model, such that the processed 
arguments logically support the decision.
Note that the interpretability/explainability problem is re-framed in the context 
of administrative and judicial decisions. Indeed, in addition to the need for inter-
pretable/explainable models, the stronger requirements ask for the processing of 
heterogeneous data (i.e., different types of data) for producing not a single output 
(the decision) but two (decision and legal articles related to the legal motivation) 
or three (decision, articles and arguments supporting the decision) outputs. This 
section presents examples of how the machine learning literature tackles the auto-
mated judicial decision by only considering the factual description (Sect. 3.3.1), 
the facts and legal articles (Sect. 3.3.2) and all three possible data elements, i.e. 
the facts, legal articles and arguments (Sect. 3.3.3).
3.3.1  Explaining judicial decisions with facts only
In the AI and law literature, explainability has not always been linked to the 
necessity to provide legal motivation and to answer arguments. For instance, Ash-
ley and Brüninghaus (2009) extract facts (called Factors) from case texts in order 
to predict the decision on the case. In order to do that, the authors derive issues 
related to the extracted facts by using a domain model. Such domain models are 
trees defining how facts must be combined to define an issue (such as “trade 
secret misappropriation”). Given the extracted issues and facts, an algorithm 
called IBP (i) predicts whether the plaintiff or the defendant is favored and (ii) 
only provides an explanation of how these facts and issues are used to make the 












Stronger Requirements (G2C): Judicial Decisions
Fig. 6  Inputs/outputs of the learning process for judicial decisions
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3.3.2  Explaining judicial decisions with facts and legal articles
A more problem-oriented way to see the stronger requirements of explainability is 
through multi-task learning. Multi-task learning is a way to learn a global model by 
splitting the learning into smaller tasks to learn (Zhong et al. 2018). This results in 
a set of small tasks that is easier to learn than learning solely the global task. Luo 
et al. (2017) propose to use a neural network (with a mechanism called attention) to 
predict the charges in criminal cases while also providing legal articles supporting 
the decision. The neural network is defined in such a way that it solves two tasks: 
charge prediction and relevant legal articles extraction. Following the same idea, 
Zhong et al. (2018) define the sub-tasks as learning (i) the applicable legal articles, 
(ii)  the charges and (iii)  the terms of penalty of a legal judgment, based on a tex-
tual fact description. In other words, from the fact description as sole input, multiple 
output are provided, such as the decision and the relevant articles supporting the 
decision. One should note that high-performing models used for multi-task learning 
are often not interpretable. For instance, in the work of Luo et al. (2017) and Zhong 
et al. (2018), black-box deep neural networks are used to solve the different tasks.
With the objective of making the automated judicial decisions interpretable, 
Li et al. (2018) use a Markov logic network (MLN) (Singla and Domingos 2005) 
to predict the outcome of divorce judgments. Their algorithm first extracts logi-
cal rules, among other preprocessing steps, from case texts. Then, these rules are 
weighted and ordered in the MLN such that following the network of rules makes 
it possible to predict a case outcome. This model is interpretable as humans can 
understand how the decisions are made.
3.3.3  Explaining judicial decisions with facts, legal articles and arguments
Most of the time, machine learning techniques in the literature do not consider the 
parties arguments. Despite that, one should note that argument mining and genera-
tion is an ongoing work in the literature (Branting 2017; Palau and Moens 2009). 
One next step could therefore be to design argument mining and generation as two 
new sub-tasks in a multi-task framework.
In the context of the European Court of Human Rights, Aletras et al. (2016) con-
sider the three elements of interest (description of the situation, the applicable laws 
and the arguments of the parties) as a text in order to predict if a given article of 
the European Convention of Human Rights has been violated. They use n-grams 
on the whole text to train a SVM with a linear kernel in order for their model to be 
interpretable. By using an interpretable model, they are able to provide how the ele-
ments of the case contributed to the decision. As these elements are legal articles 
and arguments, they can provide clues on how these articles and arguments were 
used (through the use of certain n-grams by the model) to make the decision.
Ye et al. (2018) consider the generation of court views as a sequence to sequence 
(Seq2Seq) problem, where a fact description and the charges (which correspond to 
the decision of another model) are provided as input, and a corresponding court view 
corresponding to the rationale is generated. The Seq2Seq problem is commonly 
seen in language translation. In that context, a first sequence of words in a certain 
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language is provided to the machine learning model and a second sequence of words 
corresponding to the first sequence but in another language is produced. Court view 
generation can therefore be seen as a machine translation problem, where the court 
view would be a “translation” of what can be read in a fact description.
4  Conclusion, discussion and research directions
This paper presents how the law constrains machine learning models regarding their 
interpretability and explainability. The vocabulary used in law is not always deter-
mined, nor consistent in its strength. The constraints on explainability, in their weak-
est form, can be formulated in a four-level fashion: (i) providing the main features 
used to make a decision, (ii) providing all the processed features, (iii) providing a 
comprehensive explanation of the decision and (iv)  providing an understandable 
representation of the whole model.
In the case of requirements related to administrative and judicial decisions, most 
of the work focuses on interpretable/explainable models, models that provide legal 
articles supporting their decisions, or both. However, models that provide answers 
to the arguments of the parties, alongside the decision, are not well studied in the 
machine learning literature. One clear direction, though, is the use of natural lan-
guage processing (NLP) to solve the problem, as fact descriptions, legal articles and 
arguments are often in a text format. Even the explanation of a model’s decision can 
be considered as an NLP problem through, e.g. Seq2Seq learning (Ye et al. 2018).
Note, that in Ye et al. (2018), the explainability of a model judicial decision is 
provided by the text generated by the Seq2Seq model. However, the Seq2Seq model, 
which is a deep neural network model, is not itself interpretable. Two different views 
on explainability are therefore to be put forward.
In the first view, the machine learning point of view, interpretability and explain-
ability are defined on the abstract mathematical model that is used to make the deci-
sion (Bibal and Frénay 2016). For instance, decision tree models are considered 
interpretable because their tree representation makes it easier for humans to under-
stand the abstract mathematical model behind it. By following paths in the tree, 
users follow a mathematical formula, although in an easier way.
In the second view, that rather corresponds to the legal point of view, explainabil-
ity can be defined as meaningful insights on how a particular decision is made. In 
that second view, it is not necessarily required to provide an interpretable represen-
tation of a mathematical model, but most importantly to provide a train of thought 
that can make the decision meaningful for a user (i.e. so that the decision makes 
sense to him).
This distinction is crucial for drawing the future directions of administrative and 
judicial decisions made by machine learning models. Indeed, the problem is framed 
differently for machine learning researchers. In the first view, interpretable/explain-
able models are used to understand the mathematical processes behind decisions. 
This requires to develop interpretable models or to make it possible to explain black-
box models (as developed in Sect.  3.2). In the second view, providing the human 
interpreter with an explanation of the decision that makes sense to him is the main 
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objective, even if the output is not an explanation of the mathematics behind the 
decision as such. This is the point of view adopted by the Seq2Seq solution, and 
seems to be the explainability requirement wanted in law.
Following this analysis, we call for a close inter-disciplinary dialogue between 
the legal and machine learning communities in order, on the one hand, to specify 
the undetermined terms of the law in the light of their objectives and, on the other 
hand, to develop new techniques allowing machine learning models to comply with 
the different level of explainability required by law. Furthermore, this exchange may 
also help machine learning researchers to more clearly define (and solve) the new 
problems related to the strongest legal requirements.
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